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Abstract: 
This paper explores the relationship between economic growth and the welfare state. We argue that: 
(i) the institutional constraints set by the international monetary system may be at least as effective 
determinants of growth differentials between countries as the different dimensions of their welfare 
states. We show how this international system may impose an asymmetric discipline/flexibility mix 
on  the  macreoconomic  policies  of  different  countries,  thereby  influencing  their  growth 
performance.; (ii)  the European currency reshapes some of the pre-existing constraints and also 
open up new opportunities; (iii) in the new international setting, Europe is facing a choice between 
alternative models. In one alternative, the “welfare system” needs to be reduced to a minimum; in 
the second, its  role  should be enhanced and made more active,  through an appropriate mix of 
welfare policies oriented towards the promotion of social well-being and policies oriented towards 
the promotion of productive capacities.  
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“All these objectives are inextricably linked: the large market, technological cooperation,  
strengthening the European monetary system, economic and social cohesion and the social aspects  
of collective action”  (Jacques Delors)3
 1.Introduction.
Is there a trade-off between social protection and economic growth?
Few days after the French referendum on the EU Constitution, The Economist, (june 4th-10th “It is 
Chirac, stupid”, p.12) proposed its own interpretation of the results: “Leaders can respond to such 
discontent in two ways. One is to pretend that the French social model is still valid, that no trade- 
off exists between social protection and economic growth, that France can close the shutters and 
shelter  from  global  capitalism,  that  all  the  blame  belongs  to  with  outside  forces  –  whether 
globalization, America or Brussels. The other is to admit that France cannot isolate itself from the 
world economy, to explain that the new markets are an opportunity for French companies, that job 
losses in manufacturing can be balanced by jobs creation in  services and that  inflexible  social 
protection deters the creation of new jobs”. This popular approach proposes the “American social 
model” as the successful alternative to the so-called “French social model”.  
But Tony Atkinson (1999), reviewing ten cross-country studies, reported that four of these studies 
found a positive association between social security expenditures and growth rates, four found a 
negative coefficient on the transfer variable, and two found that the coefficient was insignificant. 
Atkinson  concluded  his  thorough  analysis  by  arguing  that  empirical  evidence  on  the  issue  is 
inconclusive. Moreover, different predictions derive from alternative theoretical models. 
Thus, economic analysis does not seem to provide unconditional support to the columnist’s strong 
beliefs  concerning  a  trade-off  between  growth  and  the  welfare  state.  Consequently,  it  seems 
appropriate to enquire whether other factors, different from “social models”, should be brought into 
the picture to explain growth differentials among different countries. 
One  factor  which  is  certainly  relevant  in  this  context  are  the  macroeconomic  policies  which 
different  countries  have  been  implementing  in  the  recent  years.  These  policies  influence  these 
countries’ economic performance, by imposing a different “discipline/flexibility mix” upon each of 
them.  And -most  importantly-  these  policies  are,  to  some extent,  themselves  dictated by some 
underlying economic constraints which “bite” differently on different economies. Thus, the variable 
“discipline/flexibility mix” experienced by different countries may find its ultimate roots in these 
underlying factors. 
3 Jacques Delores, 9th Jean Monet Lecture at the European University Institute, Florence (as quoted in Bertola, Jimeno, 
Marimon, and Pissarides, 2001, p.23).
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This  paper  argues that  prominent  among these  constraints  are  those rooted in  the  international 
monetary system, and in the roles played by different countries within it. In section 2 we propose an 
analysis of how this institutional setting may influence growth differentials between Europe and the 
United States4. It is surprising that, for all the emphasis recently put on institutional arrangements as 
determinants of economic performance, such pervasive institutional constraints should be generally 
ignored in current discussion of the “endogenous virtues” of alternative economic systems, and of 
their relative growth proclivities, while the institutions of the welfare state should be left as the 
main  “institutional  culprit”.  We  argue  that  the  institutional  constraints  set  by  the  international 
monetary system may be at least as effective determinants of growth differentials between countries 
as the different dimensions of their welfare states. 
Having made the first point, we start from the fact that a group of countries (in our case, twelve 
European countries) have been able, through monetary unification to re-shape –though certainly not 
abolish- the constraints binding their policy options. On this basis, we raise our basic questions 
concerning the relationship between welfare and growth: is economic growth compatible with one 
single  social  model,  or  with  a  variety  of  welfare  systems? Should  Europe  give  up  its  welfare 
oriented social system, as The Economist suggested in the article quoted above, or rather rediscover 
and implement a model centred on citizens’ welfare? We argue that, even within the international 
constraints, Europe is facing a choice between alternative models. In one alternative, the “welfare 
system” needs to be reduced to a minimum while, in the second, its role should be enhanced and 
made more active. The choice will depend on the preferred definitions and measures of growth, 
wealth and welfare.
  
2. Flexibility and discipline in the international monetary system.
2.1. Current accounts surpluses and deficits.
We have argued in the introduction that the international monetary system may discipline countries’ 
macroeconomic policies to different degrees. This section clarifies the point through a simplified 
analysis of how this asymmetric discipline/flexibility mechanism may work in practice, and affect 
the potential for economic growth in different countries. 
To keep things simple, we start with a world inhabited by only two open economies: country A 
issues the international currency, which we call the USD, while country B issues its own currency. 
From  the  function  of  international  means  of  payments  assigned  to  USD,  and  from  the  non-
4 We take for granted that supply side factors exert a powerful influence on growth; nevertheless, in this paper we focus 
on the international monetary system, in order to enquire whether it may exert an independent influence on growth 
differentials.
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synchronisation of international sales and purchases,  it  follows that (just as an individual agent 
keeps a reserve of “liquid” assets), country B needs to accumulate a reserve of USD (Graziani, 
1979). How is country B going to “buy” the reserves  it needs? 
The only thing B can give in exchange is the goods that it produces, since its own currency- not 
being a means of international payments- is worthless for country A. In addition to selling goods to 
A,  in  an intertemporal  perspective country B may try  and sell  claims to  its  future income,  by 
convincing international investors to make direct and indirect investment in B. Abstracting from 
this and other types of international transfers, national accounting identities imply that the value of 
country B’s purchases of USD is identically equal to the value of its sales of goods and services to 
country A. In other words, country B’s trade surplus matches its capital account deficit (recently re-
labelled its financial account) i.e. its purchases of international reserves. The equality holds, with 
opposite signs, for country A’s balance of payments5. 
If country B is growing and, consequently, is involved in an increasing volume of international 
transactions, its demand for reserves grows over time. Thus, country B runs into systematic current 
account (trade) surpluses, and correspondingly country A runs into systematic trade deficits6. The 
international  monetary  system  has  a  built-in  mechanism  whereby  goods  are  transferred  from 
country B to the country issuing the international means of payments (though this tendency might 
be offset by counteracting flows on either side of the balance of payments).
The fundamental national accounting equation for open economies tells us that, for both countries:
Y- E = X-M
where Y is income, E is home expenditure, X is export and M imports. 
The only difference between them is that the sign on both sides is positive for country B, negative 
for A. In other words, country A’s expenditure exceeds its production7. 
5 Country A can finance imports of goods and services (in excess of its exports) only by borrowing from country B, i.e.  
by selling assets to B. Selling asset to foreigners is registered as a + in the financial account of the balance of payments. 
Thus, a current account deficit is always matched by an equal financial account surplus. Since selling assets implies 
borrowing  from abroad, a trade deficit and a corresponding financial surplus amounts to an addition to country A’s 
external debit.
6 Oppenheimer (1982, p.192) defined “normal or equilibrium” surpluses those which occur “in an expanding world 
economy where monetary authorities will tend to be more tolerant of persistent small surpluses than of equivalent 
deficits”.These surpluses will entail “deficits elsewhere in the system” , elsewhere being county A in our discussion. 
7 A  given  excess  of  domestic  expenditures  over  national  income  is  compatible  with  different  combinations  of 
consumption,  investment  and  public  expenditure.  Thus,  external  deficits  are  not  necessarily  “determined”  by 
expansionary fiscal policies, as the “twin deficits” hypothesis implies. With reference to the current US external deficit, 
for instance, it has been  noticed that: “from the mid 1990s until the end of 1999 the US current account deficit was 
largely a reflection of exceptionally high levels of investment Starting in 2000, but especially in 2001, investment 
collapsed. Private saving also collapsed, so there was no net improvement in the current account prior to the recent 
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Call this Asymmetry 1.
Country A buys the excess of externally produced goods by issuing USDs. As the world economy 
grows,  it  is  a  good  thing  for  both  countries  if  the  international  means  of  payment  grow 
correspondingly, thus avoiding liquidity constraints on international transactions. 
Country A may be viewed as the provider of either “the public good of international money, or, the 
private good for itself of seignorage, which is the profit that comes to the signeur, or sovereign 
power, from the issuance of money” (Kindleberger 1981, p. 248). Under either interpretation, A’s 
reliance on continued demand for USDs as reserves makes expansive monetary policies relatively 
easy (see also below, p. 6). Country B may benefit or loose as a result, but is not in a position to 
make an independent monetary policy as far as the international currency is concerned (remember 
that country B is the sum of many uncoordinated small countries). 
Call this Asymmetry 2.
Given its structural current account deficit, country A may be at a risk of paying its arguably high 
propensity to import (or, in a long run perspective, a high income elasticity of imports) with a 
downward pressure on domestic production, since a high proportion of its income buys foreign 
rather than home-produced goods. But this risk can be reduced if other components of aggregate 
demand are  high enough to pull  home production up to  compensate  for  the import-determined 
downward push. If private expenditures fail to do so, public expenditure is a good candidate, to the 
extent  that  it  stimulates  domestic  production.  Thus,  there  is  a  built-in  mechanism  making 
expansionary fiscal policy  “desirable” in A.
By contrast, country B should adopt more severe fiscal policies, as expansionary fiscal policies may 
crowd out exports directly or via their impact on domestic consumption, thus impairing its ability to 
sustain the required external surplus. 
Call this Asymmetry 3.
Does country A leave beyond its means? Yes and no: yes, because every year its buys and uses up 
more goods than it produces (i.e. its national saving is negative), meaning that foreign citizens, 
institutions and governments have been financing the excess spending through a fund inflow to the 
country.  No, because it finances this excess by selling assets, i.e. claims to its future income. In 
swelling of fiscal deficits” (Obstfeld and Regoff, 2004, p.6-7). On the other hand, it is certainly true that, starting from a 
balanced current account, an expansionary fiscal policy generates a current account deficit, if an ad hoc hypothesis of 
offsetting  changes  in  consumption  and  investment  is  avoided  (such  as  the  hypothesis  that  consumers  are  Barro-
Ricardians).
5
other  words,  A may be  living  beyond its  current  means,  but  only  as  any  debtor  does,  i.e.  by 
exchanging current consumption (by importing goods) for future consumption (when it pays off the 
loan). Thus, in order to give a more precise answer, we need to enquire further into the nature of 
these assets.
2.2. The balance of payment: trade relations and financial flows.
Let us starts with some commonplace statements. 
Country A’s CAD must be equal to its financial account surplus. Because A is a net importer of 
commodities, capital must flow into A from country B. 
As its output and exports expand, country B needs to accumulate reserves (this may be determined 
by a fixed output/reserve or import/reserve accumulation objective). Thus, because B’s demand of 
USD is always increasing in an expanding world economy, reserve accumulation by country B 
(and, more generally, its demand for A’s assets) is reflected into A’s growing external deficit (to the 
extent that this flow is not offset by A’s external investment into B)8. 
It may be considered as a paradox that country B is lending to A, and not vice versa: in current 
discussion of US external position this point has been made by Roubini (2005); Triffin (1984) and 
Lucas (1990) had similar worries. Roubini argues: “US deficit is “unprecedented” in the sense that 
the while the US is the largest country in the world, it is also the largest net debtor and the largest 
net borrower ever. Superpowers tend to be net creditors and net lenders”. It is certainly a paradox 
that emerging countries lend to the US and not the other way around.  But, to some extent, this 
systematic borrower/debtor position is conferred on A by the very “special international status of 
the US dollar” (to borrow Bernanke’s expression, see below, fn. 13): this happens because country 
B’s reserves need to be kept in the international currency, and because it does not pay country B’s 
Central Bank to keep them idle and barren in their vaults. 
The “essence of the regime” was described fifty years ago by Jacques Rueff in a very interesting 
discussion  with  Fred  Hirsch.  His  analysis  retains  some  interest  in  spite  of  the  many  changes 
undergone by the monetary system, and perhaps even more because of these changes. Therefore, it 
8 To-day, the link between the external deficit  of the “leader” and that of developing countries,  and the 
dimensions of these imbalances is at the center of the current debate. Bernanke (2005) observed that the bulk 
of the increase in the U.S. current account deficit was balanced by changes in the current account positions 
of  developing  countries  between  1996  and  2003.  Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  (2004)  also  noticed  that  dollar 
denominated reserves are held mostly by developing countries in Asia, followed by Russia, Mexico and 
Brasil. “Indeed, during late 2003 and 2004 foreign central bank acquisition nearly equalled the entire US 
current account deficit”.
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is worth quoting it at length:
“ What is the essence of the regime, and what is its difference from the gold standard? It is that 
when a country with a key currency has a deficit in its balance of payments – that is to say, the 
United States, for example- it pays the creditor country dollars, which end up in its central bank. 
But the dollars are of no use in Bonn, or in Tokyo, or in Paris. The very same day, they are re-
lent to the New York money market, so that they return to the place of origin. Thus the debtor 
country does not loose what the creditor country has gained. So the key-currency country never 
feels the effect of a deficit in its balance of payments. And the main consequences is that there 
is no reason whatever for the deficit to disappear, because it does not appear.
Let me be more positive: if I had an agreement with my tailor that whatever money I pay him he 
returns to me the very same day as a loan, I would have no objection at all to ordering more suits 
from him” (Rueff and Hirsch, 1965, p. 3) 9.
 As Rueff confirmed in this passage, capital inflows to country A are determined by the very nature 
of the international monetary system. But then the next question is: do capital inflows need to be 
attracted by relatively high real rates of return? “Conventional wisdom” held that this should be the 
case10. But there is evidence that the correlation between (long run) interest rates and net foreign 
liabilities of industrialised countries (country A in our model) has been relatively weak for more 
than a decade (IMF, 2005, p.117). How could this further paradox be explained? 
At least in part, the answer may be found in the behaviour of country B’s Central Bank, and on the 
9 It is interesting that Kant condemned this feature of the gold-exchange standard, and  also pointed out one of its  
particularly  unpleasant  consequences  as  early  as  1795:  “….a  credit  system  under  which  debts  go  increasing 
indefinitely… is a dangerous money power. This arrangement  -the ingenious invention of a commercial people in this 
century- constitutes in fact a treasure for war, exceeding the treasures of all other States taken together. It can only be 
exhausted by the ensuing deficit of the exchequer, which may be long posponed by trade prosperity and its impact upon 
production and profits. 
This facility for waging war, combined with the inclination of rulers towards it (an inclination that seems implanted in 
human nature) is therefore a great obstacle to perpetual peace. Its prohibition must be made a preliminary article of it, 
all the more so as the inevitable bankruptcy would encompass many other states in the eventual ruin, without any fault 
on their part”. (E.Kant, Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical essay, as quoted in Triffin, 1984).
10 International investors would only demand country A’s assets in the presence of a positive differential between rA and 
rB, i.e. between the two countries’ real interest rates. Given the link between interest rates and exchange rates, this view 
also implies that country A’s CAD should be accompanied, and therefore determined, by an appreciation of the USD 
relative to  the other  country’s  currency (Krugman,  1999, p.xiii,  pp.  5-6).  This line of  thought also implies  that  a 
depreciating USD would sooner or later (as the economy moves up on the rising arm of the J-curve) restore current 
account equilibrium. However, the current account deficit in country A, and the corresponding capital inflow, have been 
sustained since the beginning of the Eighties, both with an appreciating and a depreciating USD.
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influence  this  behaviour  may  have  on  private  investors.  As  we  have  seen,  B’s  Central  Bank 
“institutionally” needs to keep reserves USD denominated assets. Moreover, and most importantly, 
country B, as an emerging country, has strong incentives to accumulate reserves in order to avoid an 
appreciation of the national currency (USD depreciation), in order to sustain the competitiveness of 
its  exports.  Furthermore,  the  Central  Bank’s  precautionary  demand  may  rise  in  periods  of 
turbulence  in  financial  markets,  as  it  buys  reserves  as  an  insurance  device  against  speculative 
attacks. Because B buys financial inflows by selling enforceable claims to its future wealth, the risk 
of  default  on  its  external  debt  imposes  great  financial  prudence  on  B11.  A  high  precautionary 
demand may be the result of having learned the lesson of financial crises, rather than a pure market 
phenomenon.
B’s private investors will be encouraged to buy country A’s assets by their Central Bank support for 
the external value of the USD (Roubini and Setser, 2004). It is probably partly as a consequence of 
all  these  motivations  that  “globalization”  has  weakened the  responsiveness  of  capital  flows  to 
interest rates differentials, by reducing “home bias” in asset holdings 12. This weakened relationship 
between capital flows and interest rates may be explained by massive capital inflows from country 
B exerting a downward pressure on A’s interest rates. Country B is in a less fortunate position: 
country A’s Central Bank has no incentive to buy B’s currency. 
Summing up, the “international status of the dollar” (to use Bernanke’s words again)13 is at the root 
of  the  paradox  whereby  domestic  savings  in  B  are  diverted  from  domestic  investment,  and 
11 See the high ratio of reserves to imports of goods and services in China, India and Russia (IMF, 2005, p.260, tab. 35).
12 Home bias is the tendency for private investors to “place the bulk of their financial wealth in domestic assets despite 
more favourable risk-return profiles –before transaction costs and taxes- of globally diversified portfolios” (IMF, 2005, 
pp.111-112). Home bias is incorporated in a recent model by Blanchard, Giavazzi, Sa, 2004).
13 Bernanke, 2005 describes this phenomenon by focusing on the “special international status of the U.S. 
dollar: “The attractiveness of the United States as an investment destination during the technology boom of 
the 1990s and the depth and sophistication of the country's financial markets (which, among other things, 
have allowed households easy access to housing wealth) have certainly been important. Another factor is the 
special  international  status  of  the  U.S.  dollar. Because  the  dollar  is  the  leading  international  reserve  
currency, and because some emerging-market countries use the dollar as a reference point when managing  
the  values  of  their  own currencies,  the  saving  flowing  out  of  the  developing  world  has  been  directed  
relatively more into dollar-denominated assets, such as U.S. Treasury securities. The effects of the saving  
outflow may thus have been felt disproportionately on U.S. interest rates and the dollar. For example, the  
dollar probably strengthened more in the latter 1990s than it would have if it had not been the principal  
reserve currency, enhancing the effect on the U.S. current account” (our italics).
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channelled towards country A14. 
Call this Asymmetry 4.
2.3. External adjustment.
Barring “Ponzi finance” (a scheme in which new loans are used to pay interest on old debt) in 
the long-run debts must be paid back. Thus, we bump into the long-run consequences of the 
debt-credit relations in the international monetary system. As we will see, the difference between 
“Bretton-Woods” and the post Bretton-Woods regime is relevant here.
If a country  is a systematic borrower its debt towards country B will cumulate over the years, as 
the growth in payments to factor service income to foreign investors  accompanies the increasing 
holdings of assets by foreigners. Growth in these payments worsens both the country’s current 
account deficit and its net debt position, thus leading the country into a “debt trap”. The U.S. has 
been a net debtor country since the beginning of the Eighties.
A country’s external debt is sustainable, according to standard definitions, if the debt/GDP ratio 
is  constant  at  some target  level  (IMF,  2005,  p.  144).  Otherwise,  your  debt  will  “explode”, 
unless… unless you are country A. In this case, capital gains from exchange rate adjustment may 
add a degree of flexibility. 
Why does country A benefit from a depreciation in its currency? As is well known, depreciation 
is necessary in order to restore current account equilibrium in country A. But depreciation also 
has the very convenient  effect  of  improving its  net  foreign position (thus also reducing the 
needed amount of trade adjustment) (Gourinchas and Rey, 2005; IMF, 2005, p.126). 
This happens because a depreciation of the USD increases the value of country A’s holdings of 
foreign assets. Thus the country’s net debt position improves (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001, 
2004; Tille, 2003; Obstfeld 2004; IMF, 2005). This valuation effect amounts to a net wealth 
transfer from the “rest of the world” to country A. 
There is another side to the valuation effect: creditors bought dollar-denominated assets  before 
the depreciation of the dollar, thus incurring a loss which is obscured, but not eliminated, by the 
fact that the value of a dollar is still a dollar after depreciation (and, consequently, the nominal 
value of U.S. liabilities is unchanged). This loss would be made more  visible by reckoning the 
14 Bernanke (2005): “ Effectively, governments have acted as financial intermediaries, channelling domestic  
saving away from local  uses  and into international  capital  markets.  A related strategy has  focused on  
reducing the burden of external debt by attempting to pay down those obligations, with the funds coming  
from a  combination  of  reduced  fiscal  deficits  and  increased  domestic  debt  issuance. Of  necessity,  this 
strategy also pushed emerging-market  economies  toward current  account  surpluses.  Again,  the  shifts  in 
current accounts in East Asia and Latin America are evident in the data (…)  (our italics).
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loan,  for  instance,  in  terms  of  the  amount  of  the  traded  goods  that  foreign  countries  had 
originally to give up for each dollar, and similarly reckoning the new value of the US debt after 
depreciation. In some sense, this side of the valuation effect amounts to a “debasement” of the 
unit of account in which the debt is denominated.15
The “valuation  effect”  can  play  a  substantial  role  in  international  adjustment.  According  to 
recent  empirical  estimates  this  financial  channel  has  historically  (i.e.  from  the  Seventies 
onwards) contributed to 30% of the US financial adjustment, as has been shown by Gourinchas 
and Rey (2005). These authors also show that exchange rate adjustments are predictable, and, 
therefore, should not be modelled as surprise events. This result raises the question why should 
rational investors be willing to finance US current account deficits and hold US assets “knowing 
that these assets would underperform” (one possible explanation, as we have seen, focuses on the 
choices of country B’s Central Bank). 
Is country B in a position to resist the appreciation of its own currency relative to the USD? Only 
to the extent that it is willing (and allowed) to buy virtually unlimited amounts of dollars at the 
going price,  thus exerting a stabilising influence on the exchange rate,  i.e.  “pegging” to the 
dollar.
This is exactly what European countries did, until the “Bretton- Wood 1” system collapsed. This 
is  also what  the Central  Banks of  Japan and China have been doing for  many years  under 
“Bretton-Woods 2”, although they started to give in to western pressures in July  2005 (for the 
distinction between Bretton-Woods 1 and 2 see Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 2003).
Why is the distinction between “Bretton-Woods” and the current regime relevant? In “Bretton-
Woods”, the USD had an “anchor”, gold. This anchor did impose some degree of discipline on 
country A’s external imbalances, although it may be disputed how much this constraint was 
biting in reality16. Faced with these imbalances, owners of dollar-denominated reserves may have 
asked to convert them into gold, and, because country A had to sell the required amount at the 
15 Neapolitan monetary economists in the XVII and XVIII century used to call this the “alzamento” (the 
“rising”) and argued that, through the alzamento (the rise in the price level) sovereigns enacted a debasement 
of money, i.e. a misalignment between the value of money and the value of its metallic base. On this and 
other  distributional effects of money injections  see Costabile (2004) and (2005).
16 Oppenheimer (1982, p.193), for instance, argued that “because of the exceptional strength and confidence enjoyed by 
the dollar at the beginning, and policy moves later by the United States to prevent conversions of dollars into gold, the 
imbalance of the system was able to continue for a considerable number of years –so much so that the imbalance came 
to be wrongly seen as a trademark of the system itself”. 
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fixed rate of 35 USD per ounce of gold, it might have faced a severe drain in its gold reserves. 
Such  a  “gold  rush”  (or,  more  technically,  a  run  on  the  U.S.  gold  reserves,  i.e.  a  massive 
conversion  of  dollar  reserves  into  gold)  was,  for  many  years,  only  a  virtual  possibility. 
Nevertheless, De Gaulle at some stage tried to convert France’s dollar reserves into gold, on the 
grounds that the international exchange needed “an unquestionable monetary basis which does 
not bear the mark of any individual country” (De Gaulle 1965, quoted in Rueff and Hirsch, 
1965)17. 
In the post Bretton-Woods system, the international currency is not anchored to gold, or to any 
other base. With inconvertibility, a pure debt-credit relationship among countries is established 
(Quadrio Curzio, 1982, p.12). This makes the discipline even weaker on country A, which may 
become more willing to run into sustained external imbalances because, faced with a heavy net 
external  position,  it  may  more  easily  resort  to  depreciation  as  an  instrument  for  external 
adjustment. 
By contrast, a depreciation of B’s currency implies an increasing burden of its external debt. The 
underlying reason is that Country A’s debt is denominated in its own currency, while country 
B’s debt is typically denominated in country A’s currency18.  
Call this Asymmetry  5. 
2.4. Macroeconomic policies and growth in an asymmetric world.
Let  us  look  at  the  consequences  for  growth  of  the  five  asymmetries  indicated  above.
Firstly,  macroeconomic  policies  have  a  different  role  to  play  in  A  and  B.  Thanks  to  the 
international status of the USD, plus other related, facilitating circumstances (which are gaining 
momentum with globalization), country A enjoys a certain flexibility concerning its monetary 
policy, and both its external and public deficits. 
(i) A’s reliance on continued demand for USDs as reserves makes expansive monetary policies 
relatively easy because, as Rueff explained, whatever amount of money is created, it comes back 
straight away to A’s Central Bank. 
(ii) Capital  inflows buy the country’s financial  liabilities, and may help finance country A’s 
17 The United States responded by “making clear that requests to convert dollars into gold at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York,  though legally possible, would be viewed as an unfriendly act” (Dam, 1982, p.187). By this 
move,  as  the Italian  Central  Banker  Guido Carli  later  observed  “the  fiction of  dollar  convertibility”  had been 
“stretched beyond the limits of credibility” (Carli, 1978, p.409). The Bank of England tried to convert its dollar 
reserves on the 12th-13th of August 1971, and that was the end of “Bretton-Woods”.
18 On other consequences of the currency denomination of foreign debt see the literature on the “original sin” (e.g. 
Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza, 2005).
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investment, consumption, or public deficits, in the latter case allowing the country to adopt a 
relatively relaxed fiscal stance. 
Thanks  to  these  macroeconomic  policies  country  A  experiences  a  model  of  growth  led  by 
domestic demand. Symmetrically, country B’ growth is export-led. 
Obviously, supply side considerations are relevant to both economies. For instance, country A 
may  combine  expansive  macroeconomic  policies  with  “supply  side”  measures,  which  have 
strong distributional consequences. Similarly, in country B, supply side reforms may prevent 
wages  from rising  in  line  with  productivity  growth,  thus  encouraging  profits  and,  possibly, 
exports.
The relationship  which binds  the  two countries  together  is  rooted in  the  very nature of  the 
monetary system: in a monetary economy country B needs A’s money, and hence A’s demand 
for goods “made in B”, in order to stimulate its growth. A, in turn, becomes dependent on the 
goods made in B for satisfying the needs of its population. 
Because country A specialises as the locomotive of the world economy, the rest of the world 
needs the expansion of A’s demand for foreign goods, and –in return- is willing, or compelled, to 
accept  A’s  liabilities.  When  the  net  financial  position  of  country  A  becomes  risky  or 
unsustainable, external adjustment is restored through exchange rate adjustments, which, as we 
have seen, are helpful on both sides of the balance of payments…. And the process is ready to 
start again. 
2.5. New constraints and opportunities for Europe.
What is the role of Europe ?
In the Bretton-Woods era, Europe played as a B country, a role which the Asian Tigers, Cina, India, 
subsequently inherited, and will probably pass to other countries in the future (Dooley, Folkerts-
Landau,  Garber,  2003).  To-day  Europe  is  playing  a  new  role,  which  is  partly  the  result  of 
spontaneous evolution within the international monetary system, but, as we will see below, is partly 
the result of an independent project, aimed at liftingsome of  the constraints set by the system itself. 
The world economy becomes less simple than our two-country model with the emergence of this 
third “country” (let us call it E type), and its new currency, the Euro (we leave other groups of 
countries, such as Africa, out of our picture).
Real world developments –if analysed in this three-country framework- may provide an answer to 
our first question. Growth differentials between Europe and the US may- to a substantial extent- 
depend on the different roles played by countries within the international system, for at least two 
reasons. 
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Firstly, while Europe is a developed economy, the Euro does not share the privileged position of 
being the international reserve currency (yet?). Consequently, almost by default, it cannot rely on 
the five symmetries referred to above. Secondly- the required credibility of the new currency could 
not be established without additional constraints on the joining countries’ macroeconomic policies. 
These further constraints were unavoidable in the absence of fiscal unification, which Europe was 
unable to achieve19. Therefore, European macroeconomic policies are constrained by the need to 
strike a difficult balance between “credibility” and “growth steroids” (the latter being a label used 
for expansive monetary and fiscal policies by Eric Chaney of Morgan Stanley, who synthesised this 
point well: “Europe did not use growth steroids”). 
We  argue  that  such  pervasive  institutional  constraints  as  those  inherent  in  the  international 
monetary  system should  be  included  in  the  current  discussion  of  the  “endogenous  virtues”  of 
alternative economic systems, and of their  relative growth proclivities.  Their  neglect in current 
discourse may  be unwarranted, and  explain why  the institutions of the welfare state are considered 
as the main “institutional culprit”.
Having made this first point, we think that the relationship between the welfare state and the 
economic performance of nations requires to be reassessed in the light of the new choices that 
Europe is facing in the present.  
Europe has not merely adapted to the evolution of the international economic framework; it also 
has undertaken autonomous steps in order to change its position within it. Though the system of 
international  payments  constrains  economic policies,  it  still  leaves  room for  independent  -if 
constrained- choices, which countries may make in order to shape,  or change, their  position 
within it. 
The Euro is one example of such independent choices. A strong, credible common European 
currency is seen by European countries as a means to introduce more choice and competition 
within the international monetary system, to protect European interest within it and, by so doing, 
to act as a lever for better political integration among the member countries. 
19 The new currency required a severe policy stance, both on the monetary and the fiscal side. “Convergence” criteria 
were needed to make the Euro “credible” at its birth in international markets, and to keep it in good health afterwards. 
This objective would require, first of all, that the joining countries adopt sound monetary policies as a means to achieve 
convergence and to keep up the external value of the new money. Secondly, it required that the joining countries should 
also make a commitment, so to speak, not to undo with their fiscal policies what they were building via monetary 
policy. Relaxed fiscal policies may lead to free rider problems among European countries, generate a pressure on the 
European Central Bank to monetize current deficits, or, in the longer run, may call for unexpected inflation as a means 
to cut the real value of high public debts.
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A further, less obvious logic implication of the European project is that, gradually, as Europe 
becomes able to offer an additional, credible reserve currency to the international economy, it 
also becomes less dependent on systematic current account surpluses. If seen from this point of 
view, the European project is both an economic and a political project. In this framework, well 
devised welfare policies, together with incomes policies linking wages to productivity growth, 
may be instrumental to achieve higher domestic demand and (as we will see below) a stronger 
competitive hedge.
For these reason, the new currency area and the underlying political process reshape some of the 
pre-existing constraints20 and also open up new opportunities. Europe is devising a process of 
economic and political integration which has no historical antecedents. Within the constraints 
that we have (partially) illustrated thus far, this gives her the opportunity to stop and consider the 
alternative routes to a strong economic performance and – at the same time- a desirable system 
of welfare for its citizens.  The remaining part of this paper is devoted to a tentative exploration 
of these alternative routes.
3. Wealth and Welfare Revisited
In the opening passage of the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith forcefully points out that there is an 
important relationship between the wealth of a nation and the welfare of its citizens:
The  annual  labour  of  every  nation  is  the  fund  which  originally  supplies  it  with  all  the 
necessaries and conveniences of life which it  annually consumes, and which consist  always 
either in the immediate produce of that labour, or in what is purchased with that produce from 
other nations (Smith, WN, Introduction and Plan of the Work).
The above passage calls attention to the relationship between the ‘wealth’ of a nation (ultimately, its 
labour fund) and the availability of goods and services necessary to human life. Smith’s definition 
of wealth is in no way limited to the supply of marketed goods and services21. As pointed out by 
20 Europe is now in a position to face a larger spectrum of monetary policy choices, although, the Euro not being a 
magic wound, these are difficult choices. For instance, in these years Europe is facing the following dilemma: it may 
either join China and Japan in accumulating reserves in dollars, or refuse to do so. The former alternative would help 
stabilise the dollar, by sustaining its external value, thus preventing further  appreciation of the Euro, which is harmful 
to Europe’s competitiveness. But, by so doing, Europe would help financing us deficits, and the US international policy 
financed thereby. The alternative is that Europe refuses to accumulate huge reserves in USD denominated assets: but 
this amounts to contributing to further USD depreciation that may harm European competitiveness, particularly because 
of slowly adjusting USD-renmibi exchange rate.
21 From Smith’s point of view, the wealth of nations includes ‘social common capital’, as recently defined by Hirofumi 
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Giorgio Fua’, the most distinctive feature of Smith’s definition of national wealth is the fact that 
‘the notion is established by considering an object […] which is a collection of things […] defined 
from a dual point of view: their attitude to satisfy the needs or at least the tastes of life; the way in 
which they are obtained, that is through the carrying out of human labour’ (Fua’, 1957, p. 21). 
 Smith’s conception does not entail any presumption that the wealth of a nation should be measured 
primarily  by  the  quantity  of  traded  commodities  available  to  that  nation  directly  or  through 
international trade. Smith’s criticism of the mercantilist association between the wealth of a nation 
and its treasure (its current account surplus) suggests that, in his view, treasure is not a secure basis 
for the increase of national wealth. 
 Indeed, Smith argues that, under certain conditions, a persistent current account surplus could be 
associated with the gradual contraction of national wealth. This would be the case if a nation were 
to expand its treasure (its current account surplus) by becoming less and less able to meet the needs 
of its citizens.
Smith  points  out  that  production and division  of  labour  are  the  primary  means by which it  is 
possible to increase wealth as welfare. However, the characteristic of labour activity that is here in 
the foreground is the provision of human needs, not the provision of goods through markets. 
Smith’s wealth comparisons are based on the measurement of wealth as labour commanded. This is 
the quantity of ‘external’ labour (labour of other individuals, or of other countries) that any given 
individual (or country) has at her disposal through the sale of her assets (material goods, financial 
activities, or even working activity itself). 
Uzawa (Uzawa, 2005). According to Uzawa, ‘social common capital provides members of a society with those services 
and institutional arrangements that are crucial in maintaining human and cultural life. It is generally classified in three 
categories: natural capital, social infrastructure, and institutional capital’ (Uzawa, 2005, p. vii). Arthur Cecil Pigou, 
following a suggestion of  Marshall,   stressed the relationship of wealth to welfare,  but narrowed the definition of 
economic welfare to ‘welfare arising in connection with the earning and spending of the national dividend, or, in other 
words, of those parts of the community’s net income that enter easily into relation with the measuring rod of money’ 
(Pigou, 1912, p.  3).   Partha Dasgupta  and Karl  Göran Mäler  have emphasized the need  to detach cross-country 
comparisons of social welfare from comparisons in terms of gross domestic product (GNP) or net national product 
(NNP): ‘social well-being in a country is higher (lower)  than in any of its immediate neighbours if the value of the 
difference  in  the  flow of  consumption  services  between  them plus  the  difference  in   the  value  of  aggregate  net 
investment between them is positive (negative)’ (Dasgupta and Göran Mäler, 2000, p. 86). This proposition leads to the 
conclusion that ‘social welfare is higher today than it was yesterday if the economy is wealthier today’,  so that ‘cross-
country comparisons of  NNP  [or  of  GNP] tell  us  nothing about  differences  in  social  well-being excepting under 
empirically uninteresting circumstances’ (Dasgupta and Göran Mäler, 2000, pp. 84-86).  Dasgupta’s and Göran Mäler’s 
result  suggests  that  Pigou’s definition of economic welfare in  terms of national  dividend is  too narrow, and calls 
attention to Adam Smith’s definition in terms of a fund capable of delivering a flow of  goods and services.
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Smith’s  conception  of  ‘labour  commanded’  is  a  powerful  tool  for  wealth  analysis.   Its  most 
distinctive feature is that it distances the measurement of wealth from the availability of treasure, 
and makes the ‘command’ on labour a general capacity to be realized in a  variety of conditions. 
Labour  commanded (and the  wealth  associated with  it)  can  derive  from the  practice of  useful 
activities or from the availability of useful assets. In general, the labour commanded by any given 
nation derives from a portfolio of labour-commanding resources (some associated with production 
activity, others associated with the ownership of natural or financial assets).
The  labour-commanded  view suggests  that  the  wealth  of  any  given  nation  may be  stationary, 
increase or decrease as result of changes in its portfolio of labour-commanding resources. Three 
principal cases may be distinguished. In one case, the wealth increase may result from an expansion 
of productive activities leading to increasing exports and to an increasing current account surplus 
(export-led wealth increase). Here, the command on labour increases due to competitive advantage 
and international trade. A second case is that in which the command on labour (thus, available 
wealth) increases merely as a result of treasure appreciation (increased value of financial assets). In 
a third case, the command on labour increases as a result of the  expansion  of the production of 
goods and services that are not internationally traded. Here, the increased command on labour may 
be  associated  with  the  expansion  of  social,  educational  or  environmental  activities  (and  is 
independent of a current account surplus). Finally, we may have an increased command on labour 
induced  by an upgrading of the production of goods and services (independently of  whether they 
are internationally traded or not).  For example, the labour commanded by a typical service activity 
at time t may be greater than the labour commanded by that activity at time  t-1.
In short, any given country has more labour commanded at its disposal if there is an increase in the 
over-all  command on labour associated with its activities or its endowments. A country with a 
highly developed division of labour is normally wealthier than a country in which division of labour 
has a narrower scope.
The  theory  of  entitlements  is  closely  associated  with  the  labour  commanded  view  originally 
formulated by Smith. This theory suggests that the bundle of entitlements upon which the average 
citizen of any given country may lay a claim measures the average welfare in that country. To 
conclude, there is an important tradition in economic theory according to which the measurement of 
wealth cannot be detached from the measurement of welfare.22
22 The theory of entitlements gives a clue into the relationship between the wealth of any given country and the extent 
of  the division of labour in that country. This is because, in   a country characterized by a developed division of labour, 
the average citizen may command a larger and more diverse bundle of entitlements relative to the average citizen of a 
country in which division of labour is less developed.  The same is true for international division of labour. Here, the 
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4. Welfare, Trade and Growth Policy
4.1. A Taxonomy of Welfare Policies: Capacity Promotion vs. Well-being Promotion
The average welfare of the citizen of any given country has a different structure depending on 
whether we consider capacity development or well-being. Capacities are associated with productive 
abilities, and may be promoted by educational policies23. Well-being is associated with objective 
living conditions or the satisfaction of needs and desires: health care system and social insurance 
are  among  the  appropriate  policy  instruments.  Of  course,  there  may  be  considerable  overlap 
between actions promoting the development of capacities and actions directly promoting the well-
being of individuals.
Capacity promotion and well being promotion may be an end in itself, or they may be instrumental 
to the achievement of  other goals.  And these goals  may be sharply different in the two cases. 
Capacities  are  inherently  intentional.  This  suggests  that,  in  certain  cases,  the  development  of 
capacities makes  individuals  (or  groups)  better  able  to  perform tasks or  functions  that  may be 
assigned to them. In particular, some of these tasks may be instrumental to the production of traded 
goods and services. In this way, capacity development can both be an objective in itself and a 
means to achieve a better performance in the formation of marketable wealth.  The direct promotion 
of well-being has different implications. For well-being is  not inherently intentional. This means 
that, differently from capacity promotion, well-being promotion is not directly instrumental to the 
promotion of competitiveness on international markets.  
The distinction between capacity development and well-being development suggests that welfare 
policies may take two alternative routes. In one case (capacity promotion), welfare policies target 
the  productive  potential  (in  a  wide  sense)  of  human  beings.  In  the  other  case  (well-being 
promotion),  welfare  policies  target  the  objective  living  conditions  or  the  ‘feeling  potential’  of 
human beings. 
average citizen of a country whose terms of trade allow access to the full range of internationally traded goods and 
services commands a larger and more varied bundle of entitlements relative to the average citizen of a country whose 
terms of trade only allow limited access to international markets. Entitlement to an expanded set of goods and services 
(marketed or not) is associated with increased national wealth.  The average citizen of any given country is wealthier 
both when the terms of trade of her country are improving and when the set of ‘internal entitlements’ in that country are 
expanding. This suggests that the dynamics of the wealth of nations may be affected by conflicting influences. For 
example, the wealth (and welfare) of the average citizen of any given country may alternatively increase, decrease or 
remain constant, if an improvement of the international terms of trade of his country is associated with a contraction of 
the internal entitlements to which that average citizen has access.
23 Capacities in our sense are different from Sen’s capabilities. See Sen (1985, 2004).
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It is possible to design welfare policies in which the emphasis on capacity promotion comes at the 
expense of well-being. This may be the case if policy promotes certain capabilities out of proportion 
relative to others, so that the over-all balance is lost. On the other hand, it is possible to design a 
welfare  policy  in  which  well-being  is  promoted  at  the  expense  of  capacity  development.   For 
example, a welfare policy could promote the alleged well-being of consumers by simply increasing 
their  purchasing  power  without  targeting  the  structure  of  consumer  expenditure  (and  thus, 
presumably, forsaking the goal of  deeper changes in consumer capacities). 
       4.2 The Impact of Welfare Policies upon Trade Performance and Capital Flows
The  two  welfare  policies  have  different  economic  consequences.  It  is  generally  admitted  that 
capacity  promotion  (for  example,  through  better  educational  systems)  is  likely  to  increase  the 
productive  potential  of  a  given  economy,  both  quantitatively  and  qualitatively.  This  may  be 
associated with increased competitiveness and better performance on world markets. 
Less well known, but no less important, is that well-being promotion may induce a significant taste 
improvement of the average consumer, making her able to demand more sophisticated goods as 
services (especially if well-being promotion induces a change in consumer capacities). Although 
this  situation  is  not  immediately  translatable  into  macroeconomic  consequences,  a  more 
sophisticated demand structure may induce a significant transformation of the internal market for 
high value-added goods, and thus indirectly become an important incentive for the development of 
sophisticated technical abilities.
Carlo  Poni  and  Neil  McKendrick have  produced  historical  examples  of  such  a  promotion  of 
consumer capacities leading to a striking increase in international competitiveness. Carlo Poni has 
argued that the commercial and industrial development of the towns of northern and central Italy in 
the middle ages was initially stimulated by internal demand for sophisticated consumer goods (a 
feature he associates with the relatively ‘horizontal’ distribution of purchasing power in the upper 
social strata of urban population). (Poni, 2001). A similar argument was made by Neil McKendrick 
in  the  context  of  the  consumer  revolution  of  18th century  Britain.  In  this  case,  according  to 
McKendrick, the expansion of middle social strata made possible the mass consumption of high-
quality  consumer  goods  and  the  development  of  the  corresponding  technical  skills  for  their 
production (Mc Kendrick, 1970; see also McKendrick, Brewer and Plumb, 1982).  In both cases 
(medieval Italy and  18th century Britain)  consumers developed sophisticated ‘niches of taste’, 
which in turn encouraged the development of technical abilities and ultimately affected in a positive 
way the international competitiveness of locally produced goods and services.
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Through these channels, welfare policy may be an important instrument of trade policy. But, as we 
have seen, its effects may be hugely different depending on its target and structure. Virtuous or 
vicious circles may be set in motion, depending on policy design. A welfare policy based upon 
capacity promotion may induce increased competitiveness. However, this increase may come at the 
expense  of  well-being  (especially  if  a  policy  of  unbalanced  capacity  promotion  is  pursued). 
Similarly,  a  welfare  policy  exclusively  based  upon  transfers  of  purchasing  power  may  reduce 
competitiveness on world markets (especially if that policy is associated with a constant or slowly 
adjusting structure of consumer expenditure). In both cases, a vicious circle is introduced, in which 
well-being and capacity are conflicting objectives, and may ultimately weaken each other in the 
long-run. But it is important to point out that welfare policy may also induce a  virtuous circle of 
welfare and competitiveness improvements.  As our historical  examples show, a policy of well-
being promotion aimed at the development of consumer capacities (see above) could go hand in 
hand with a policy of capacity promotion aimed at the development of producer capacities. We may 
expect that such a policy could lead to an improved export performance of the productive sectors 
originally stimulated by the expanded internal demand for sophisticated (or new) consumer goods.
In addition to their effects on trade policies, different approaches to the welfare of nations may be 
associated with different approaches to international finance.  
Our argument can be restated by looking at the two sides of a country’s balance of payments. On 
the current account side, capacity-oriented welfare policy is likely to directly encourage the active 
promotion  of  technological  capabilities,  and  more  generally  the  active  governance  of  the 
competitive advantage on international markets.  For example, an active educational policy may be 
part  of  this  approach (although education may also promote capacities  that  are  not  necessarily 
instrumental to the promotion of competitiveness on international markets). 
Coming to the financial side, welfare policy is similarly double-hedged with respect to international 
capital  flows.  Capacity  promotion  may  require  very  substantial  capital  inflows,  and  thus  be 
associated with a policy of relative openness to international capital markets. On the other hand, 
substantial  public investment may be a  condition for the promotion of capacities.  In this  case, 
constraints  upon capital  flows may be likely,  if  taxation of income and wealth is the principal 
source of State finance. 
Capital flows may also be positively or negatively affected by well-being oriented policies, which 
are often associated with the expansion of internal demand. In one case, well-being promotion in 
the absence of development  in consumer capacities  is  likely to  induce the growth of imported 
resource  and goods,  which  may ultimately  determine  substantial  capital  outflows  and calls  for 
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restriction  on  international  capital  flows.  By  contrast,  well-being  promotion  associated  the 
development  of  consumer  capacities  and  the  acquisition  of  new  competitive  advantages  on 
international markets has different consequences. In an early phase, international capital flows are 
initially less significant, since the expansion of internal demand is associated with the expansion of 
internal capacities. In a later phase, increased exports of internally produced goods may bring about 
a significant increase of capital inflows. Both in its early and in its late phase, this scenario excludes 
significant restrictions upon international capital flows.
To sum up, welfare policies may be an important influence upon the formulation of trade policy and 
international monetary policy. However,  this influence is not unambiguous.  A capacity-oriented 
policy  is  generally  associated  with  freedom of  trade  in  commodity  markets,  but  may  also  be 
associated with demands for restrictions on international capital flows if the financing of capacity 
promotion depends primarily (or exclusively) on taxation. Similarly, a well-being oriented policy 
may eventually  induce  restrictions  to  free  trade  both  in  the  commodity  and capital  markets  if 
internal demand expansion takes place independently of any significant development in consumer 
capacities. 
As a final point, it is important to note that, in our evaluation of different types of welfare policies, 
we have thus far assumed the international monetary system as a given constraint. Consequently, 
we have tried to assess the positive or negative impact of these policies on the required trade and 
current account surplus. However, as we argued above, these surpluses may become a less binding 
constraint,  following  the  current  gradual  introduction  of  a  multilateral  set  of  monetary 
arrangements. As we argue below, this weaker current account constraint opens up an entirely new 
scenario, whereby welfare policies acquire some degree of autonomy.
5.  A Trade Scenario and a Welfare Scenario: Alternatives for Europe.
At the beginning of the 21st century, Europe is facing two alternative policy scenarios.  In the first 
scenario (the  trade scenario), Europe takes the system of international monetary arrangements as 
given, and determines on that basis its set of welfare policies.  In the second scenario (the welfare 
scenario), Europe takes a system of welfare institutions as given, and determines on that basis its 
trade  policy.   This  rule  of  decomposition  in  the  analysis  of  economic  policy  has  interesting 
implications. In particular, the above decomposition rule entails that the feasibility of welfare and 
trade policies may depend upon which hierarchy of goals is considered24. The trade scenario renders 
24 The rule of decomposition (for the policy domain) stipulates a given objective and moves back from that objective to 
the set of policy options compatible with it. It is an application of  Lowe’s instrumental analysis since, rather than 
arguing ‘from behavioural premises to terminal states’ (Lowe, 1976, p.12), it searches “ backward” for the determinants 
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welfare policies feasible or unfeasible depending on whether they are compatible with the stipulated 
rules  of  trade.  The  welfare  scenario  makes  trade  policies  feasible  or  unfeasible  depending  on 
whether they are compatible with the stipulated welfare objectives.  
It is important to emphasize that, within each scenario, a range of different policies is available. In 
the trade scenario (which is close to the current position of Europe in the world economy), welfare 
policies may be an important instrument for the achievement of the stipulated trade objective (a 
current account surplus). However, the trade objective may require the implementation of a specific 
bundle of welfare policies to the exclusion of others. For example, current account surpluses may be 
compatible with the implementation of welfare policies aimed at well-being promotion through the 
development of consumer capacities, or  to the implementation of policies directly aimed at the 
development  of  technical  abilities  in  export-led  sectors.  On  the  other  hand,  current  account 
surpluses may be incompatible with welfare policies aimed at capacity development (particularly 
when the financing of the corresponding investment leads to the relative ‘closure’ of international 
capital  markets).  They  may  also  be  incompatible  with  welfare  policies  aimed  at  well-being 
promotion through the expansion of the internal demand for traditional goods and services. In this 
perspective, some current policy proposals pursued at the European level suggest an export-led (or 
mercantilist) point of view. The idea that there is a trade off between the welfare of an economic 
area and its competitiveness is a mercantilist proposition that was already criticized long ago by 
Daniel  Defoe25.  As we have seen, the contraction of welfare expenditure and social rights  as a 
necessary condition for international competitiveness is but one option within the trade scenario.
Similarly, a range of different trade policies is available if the welfare scenario is considered. In this 
of given states’  (Lowe,  ibidem).  Lowe also emphasized the essentially heuristic  character  of instrumental  analysis 
(Lowe, 1976, pp. 12-13; see also Scazzieri, 1998). A similar approach is followed by John Hicks in his discussion of 
optimum theory: ‘[t]he form of organization by which the optimum is to be reached is not prescribed; the question 
whether it can be reached by a competitive system is left open. The general character of the path which will satisfy 
optimum conditions  is the sole question that is at issue’ (Hicks, 1965,  p. 204). 
25 Daniel Defoe, in his Plan of the English Commerce (1728), strongly criticized the common mercantilist proposal of 
low wages as a means to enhance international competitiveness, and denied that ‘a country might become rich through 
the  poverty  of  its  people’  (Huckster,  1994,  p.171;  1st end  1931).  In  particular,  Defoe  countered  the  low-wage 
proposition by arguing that ‘ [if] […] these Gentlemen who are forcing the Consumption of our Manufacture in England 
(or in any of those countries in Europe where they work cheapest) by their mere Cheapness, are content to reduce the 
wages of the People who make them, to the rate of those in China or India, there is no doubt they might increase the 
Consumption and sell of f the quantity: but what would be the Advantage? They would sell their Goods and ruin their 
People; the Benefit of which in the Gross, I confess I do not understand’ (Defoe, 1728, as quoted in Huckster, 1994, 
1994, vol. II, p. 171). An echo of Defoe’s argument is to be found in Smith’s statement that ‘[n] o society can surely be 
flourishing  and happy,  of  which the  far  greater  part  of  the  members  are  poor  and  miserable’  (Smith,  1776,  WN, 
I.viii.36).
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case, we may expect different policies depending upon whether capacity promotion or well-being 
promotion is being pursued. Capacity promotion is  compatible with unlimited free trade if capacity 
investment is financed through international capital (rather than with internal capital or taxation). 
Well-being promotion is compatible with unlimited free trade if the expansion of internal demand is 
associated with the development of consumer capacities.  In general, however, the welfare scenario 
makes free trade to be feasible  along a continuum of possibilities. For example, with a capacity-
oriented policy, free trade in commodity markets may be more likely than free trade in capital 
markets, and free trade in capital markets may presuppose a specific structure of investment finance 
for capacity development (see above). On the other hand, with a well-being oriented policy, import-
substitution may be favoured relative to free trade in an initial phase (when consumer capacities 
have not yet developed to a sufficient degree). In a later phase, import-substitution may be dropped 
and the emphasis of trade policy may shift towards free trade (presumably, first in the markets 
where a competitive advantage has been acquired, later in the markets for other goods and services).
6. Concluding remarks.
This paper has explored the relationship between economic growth and the welfare state by raising 
two  questions:  firstly,  can  growth  differentials  between  economic  systems  be  explained  by 
differences  in  the  dimensions  and  characters  of  their  welfare  systems?  Secondly,  is  economic 
growth  compatible  with  one  single  social  model,  or  with  a  variety  of  welfare  systems?  The 
underlying,  basic  question  is  easy  to  detect:  should Europe  give  up its  welfare  oriented social 
system, or rediscover and implement a model more actively centred on the welfare of its citizens?
The proposed approach has focused on the institutional international scenario. In order to assess the 
constraints  on,  and the opportunities for growth in different  countries,  we have focused on the 
working of the international monetary system, and on its recent evolution following the introduction 
of the Euro.
We have argued that the international monetary system imposes a different “discipline/flexibility 
mix” on each country (or group of countries), and that the asymmetries thus generated may go a 
long  way  towards  explaining  growth  differentials  between  economies.  The  current  debate  on 
welfare systems, while duly considering the global dimension, may have underrated the influence of 
this specific international factor. 
International constraints are a critical influence on growth, welfare and trade policies in Europe. We 
have argued that, even taking these constraints fully into account, two broad sets of alternative are 
open. 
Firstly,  the  trade  scenario  may  or  may  not  require  a  diminished  role  for  welfare  institutions, 
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depending on the choice of a welfare threshold, and on the prefereed mix of well-being and capacity 
oriented welfare policies. Europe has a fine choice between alternative policy options within this 
scenario, and the mercantilist model should not be taken for granted.
Secondly, we argue that Europe may also envisage a more fundamental choice between alternative 
scenarios.  Gradually,  the  new money,  if  successfully  established  in  international  markets,  may 
enable Europe to overcome the mercantilist identification between “treasure” and wealth, and to 
avoid the need for systematic current account surpluses. Welfare policies, if properly devised, may 
be a useful instrument in this evolution from a trade scenario to a welfare scenario.
Actual choices will reflect equilibria determined by existing institutions, beliefs and the contrasting 
influence of interest groups.
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